

SOME NOTES ON THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE
THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE
OTTOMAN-TURKISH STATE*

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The interpreter of history is in a dangerous occupation. Can he at the same time be sensitive to the movements of all social systems, avoid trying to confine history to any particular straight jacket, beware of giving random events more importance than they deserved, be sensitive to the unnerving complexity both of man and society, and still avoid the temptation to despair?

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I.

Administrative reform has always been in the limelight in the developing countries. This is not, of course, surprising. With the revolution of rising expectations in these countries, an attempt has been made to telescope into a few decades, a development process that took centuries elsewhere. Thus it became imperative to intervene in evolutionary process of change and to replace it, in large measure, with a teleological process. In the emergent framework of induced change, certain instruments of action rose to prominence. The administrative system was considered to be one such instrument essential in formulating and carrying out operating programs.¹ Consequently much attention has

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*** *A Primer on Social Dynamics: History as Dialectics and Development*, New York, 1970, p. 18.

been paid to determine the "deficiencies" in the administrative systems of the developing countries and to eliminate them.

In the Ottoman-Turkish State the interest in "administrative" reform, of course, precedes the more recent preoccupation, in this matter, of the contemporary developing countries.² But not until after the Second World War that idea of administrative reform as it is conceived today gained wide currency.

In the 1950s, the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East was established which offered courses of essentially O and M type, and also conducted empirical studies in many fields including personnel system, local government and the state economic enterprises. A New York University group engaged in similar activities in the Institute and in the Faculty of political Sciences, Ankara University. In 1958, a short lived Ministry of Coordination was established. With the establishment of State Planning Organization in the early 60s, a new interest developed for efficient administration of programs of economic and social development.³ These developments culminated in a major research project in 1962 "in order to determine the manner of distribution of the central government organization in Turkey (with the exception of certain central agencies).. and to examine whether this distribution permits the rendering of the public services in the most efficient way, and to make proposals and recommendations."⁴ This was to be done by avoiding "theoretical criteria

¹ Milton J. Esman, "Politics of Development Administration", in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.) *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration, and Change*, pp. 78-87.

² The Westernization process and thus the reform idea in the Ottoman-Turkish state may be considered to extend all the way back to what is known as the Tulip Era of 1730 s, and to the sporadic contacts made with the West during that and the following periods. See Niyazi Berkes. *The Development of Secularization in Turkey*, Montreal 1964, Chapter 2; and Stanford J. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers", in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (ed) *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, Chicago 1969, p. 32.

³ C. H. Dodd, "Administrative Reform in Turkey", *Public Administration* (London), Spring 1965, pp. 71-83.

⁴ "Organization and functions of the Central Government of Turkey". Report of the Managing Board of the Central Government Organization Research Project, Ankara 1965, p. 9. This is also known as the MEHTAP Report.

and definitions.”⁵ The Commission adopted an extremely practical approach and interpreted its task as being concerned with deficiencies in the actual performance of functions without too much concern as to whether these resulted from bad distribution alone.⁶ All in all, it was really a POSDCORB approach, but more intuition and practical wisdom derived from everyday experience.⁷

With the political developments since the memorandum from the Military in March 12, 1971, the interest on administrative reform has again come to the surface. The Erim government included it in its cabinet program, and stated that there is a need to integrate the work already done, and to further it by establishing an advisory committee attached to the office of the Prime Minister.⁸ This was followed by certain official statements to the effect that there might be a need for removing certain bureaucratic elite, and that the bureaucracy should be “Atatürkist and conscientious.”⁹ These statements led to a dialogue on the matter, and views were offered that the bureaucrats should have the highest possible legal protection and that only under these conditions one could expect an efficient and loyal service from the bureaucrats. These views were backed by examples picked from the “modern” countries of the West.¹⁰

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Dodd, “Administrative Reform in Turkey”, p. 75. Administrative reform efforts emphasizing redistribution of tasks are often self-defeating; as yet there is no consensus on a set of criteria indicating the “best” distribution. See Bernard Gournay (Translated by İhsan Kuntbay) *Yönetim Bilimine Giriş: Çağdaş Topumlarda Kamu Yönetimi*, Ankara 1971, p. 18.

⁷ The general tendency was toward centralization and short span of control to strengthen the hands of the bureaucratic elite but no rigid formula was utilized throughout. See pages 46 and 47 of the Report, for example, on different applications of the span of control principle. For later reorganization efforts along the same lines, see Kenan Sürgüt, “Türkiyede İdareyi Yeniden Düzenleme ve Geliştirme Çabaları”, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi* June 1968, pp. 3-17. The administrative reform efforts following the Memorandum of March 12 again placed emphasis on experience. One of the conditions to be eligible for membership in the Reform Commission established by the Erim government was to have had prior bureaucratic experience.

⁸ *Milliyet* April 3, 1971, p. 11.

⁹ Made by Mr. Sadi Koçuş, Vice Prime Minister of Political and Administrative Affairs.

¹⁰ Vakur Versan, “Siyaset ve İdare”, *Milliyet* May 5, 1971, p. 2.

II.

It seems to the present author that some thought should be given to the assumptions behind these reform strategies so as to be better able to evaluate the reform efforts in the Ottoman-Turkish State. The basic assumption behind the administrative reform strategies in the Ottoman-Turkish State as elsewhere have usually been that the administrative system would have extensive autonomy from other social systems in the sense that one can improve administrative performance by manipulating independent variables unique to the administrative system, and that it would be possible to devise an ideal blueprint relevant to all times, places, and goals.

This is the strategy of "administrative systems approach" to administrative reform: It is assumed that some societies are capable of producing more goods and services to meet the changing needs and demands and that they have developed a certain set of organizations, and processes of allocating resources: the latter are "rational" and can and should be transferred and learned¹¹. In other words, it is thought possible to borrow certain end results of a process in order to realize that process itself. By "the end result" here, the reference is of course to some characteristics of the administrative systems of the developed countries, and the "process" refers to the societal evolution of the now developed countries and the consequent standards of living they have attained¹². The latter remains to be the basic aspiration in the developing countries.

The said administrative characteristics were expressed either as a set of "principles", or in the form of bureaucratic models. The

¹¹ Warren F. Ilchman, "Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development Administration", *Public Administration Review* September 1965, pp. 314-328.

¹² Here no attention is paid to the potential problems the bureaucracies posed in the developed settings. On these problems, see Kenneth A. Megil *The New Democratic Theory* New York 1970, pp. 99-119. Also of course, is lacking any serious attention to normative implications of change. On this matter, see, inter alia, Dennis Goulet, "Development for What?" *Comparative Political Studies* July, 1968; Desmond L. Anderson, "Prologue to Development: A Rendez-vous with Conscience," *Public Administration Review* July, August 1968, pp. 369-372.

"principles" later developed into the "classical" organization theory gradually came under severe attacks.¹³

The impact these criticisms made led to an internal dynamic in the development of theories of bureaucracy and of organization: the problematics of each approach and its weak points has become potential foci of theoretical change in so far as attempts were made to overcome such difficulties and to provide a more adequate conceptual framework.¹⁴

Parallel to the development of such a "managerial tradition", there also developed theories of bureaucracy largely based on Weber's "ideal-type" bureaucracy. The latter was a conceptual construction of certain empirical elements into a logically precise and consistent form which, in its ideal purity was never to be found in concrete reality.¹⁵ The problematics of the Weber's ideal-type in turn led to what is known as post-Weberian theories of bureaucracy.¹⁶

Despite these criticisms of and later theoretical developments on these initial principles and models of administration vis-a-vis the developed settings, these original blueprints for change have remained as invaluable tools in the theory and practice of technical assistance efforts. This was largely the consequence of the increasing gap between the administrators of development and the scholars of development. While the scholarship made impressive contributions to the dynamics of change and to the necessary requirements for mounting planned development efforts, there has occurred a distinct administrative lag in operationalizing these findings into public policy and action.¹⁷ As

¹³ Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, New York 1957, pp. 20-45, and Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration", in Claude E. Hawley and Ruth G. Weintraub, *Administrative Questions and Political Answers*, New York 1966, pp. 23-33.

¹⁴ Nicos P. Mouzelis *Organization and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories*, Chicago 1968, pp. 3-4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-66.

¹⁷ See Morroe Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West", in Nimrod Raphaeli (ed). *Readings in Comparative Public Administration*, Boston 1966, pp. 373-384, Frederick T. Bent, "The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change". *Journal of Comparative Administration* May 1969, pp. 47-64, and Garth N. Jones, "Failure of Technical Assistance in Public Administration Abroad: A Personal Note", *Journal of Comparative Administration* May 1970, pp. 10-11.

administrative systems approach to reform left its place to social systems approach where emphasis is placed on the interrelationships of factors in the social system to find the sources of higher productivity¹⁸, theory has become more sophisticated but less applicable due largely to the complexity of factors that had to be taken into account.¹⁹

The usual cycle, however, from micro to comprehensive or grand theory and onto middle range or partial theories seems to have been followed in the field of Comparative Public Administration too. That development opened up new vistas for the theory and practice of administrative reform. But before going into recent developments in theory relevant to reform efforts in developing countries in general and in Turkey in particular it is in order now to elaborate at some length on the salient features of the development and the role of the administrative systems in the developed countries, then to look at some relevant characteristics of the developing countries, and thus explain the basic incompatibility of the Western models for the developing countries where the aim is to get from the bureaucracy the same performance as that in the developed countries.²⁰ In this brief exposé, care will

¹⁸ Ilchman, "Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development Administration", *passim*.

¹⁹ See Milton J. Esman and John D. Montgomery, "Systems Approaches to Technical Cooperation: The Role of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review* September, October 1969, pp. 507-539, and Dwight Waldo, "Public Administration and Change: Terra Paene Incognita," *Journal of Comparative Administration* May, 1969, pp. 94-113. Cf. Ralph Braibanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth," in Fred W. Riggs (ed) *Frontiers of Development Administration* Durham, North Carolina 1970. pp. 102-104. In Comparative Public Administration the most prominent member of the grand theory is Fred W. Riggs. See his *Administration in Developing Countries* Boston 1964. Middle range theorists are led by Ferrel Heady. See his *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, New Jersey 1966.

²⁰ The present author is aware of the fact that nowadays the Western models are not the only models aspired to. See, for instance, Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case", in Joseph La Palombara (ed) *Bureaucracy and Political Development* Princeton, New Jersey 1966. But where bureaucracy is concerned, the Western models still play the avant-garde role. In this country, analyses of bureaucracy with a Marxist orientation seems to adhere to the Marxist theory in belittling bureaucracy as an action instrument but put emphasis on its political role. See, inter alia, İdris Küçükömer *Düzenin Yabancılaşması: Batılama* İstanbul 1969. On the significant role of bureaucracy as an action instrument in a socialist coun-

be taken to put emphasis upon those predominantly systemic variables particularly relevant for the Turkish situation.

III.

In the West, the bureaucracy has never been an all purpose action instrument, but with the changing goals and power configurations in the society it has assumed different characteristics. Also significant is that the ecology of the bureaucracy in the West has been significantly different from that of the bureaucracies in the presently developing countries.

Bureaucracy in the West assumed its general characteristics during the transition from feudalism to the modern industrialized state. During the rise of the nation state, the monarchical policy of centralization and unification and its economic corollary-mercantilism-necessitated the emergence and the systematic use of administration by the monarchic-dynastic states.²¹ During this period, the effectiveness rather than efficiency²² of the bureaucracy seems to have been more important.²³ With the advent constitutionalism in the wake of the middle classes, the state bureaucracies lost their autonomies in the polity and were induced to adopt what we might call a more technical concept of efficiency. This development exposed a crucial relationship between the middle class supremacy in politics and the nature of bureaucratic

try, see Joseph S. Berliner, "Bureaucratic Conservatism and Creativity in the Soviet Economy", in Fred W. Riggs (ed) *Frontiers of Development Administration*, pp. 569-597 and Kenneth T. Jowith, "Time and Development under Communism: The case of the Soviet Union," in Dwight Waldo (ed) *Temporal Dimensions of Development Administration* Durham, N. C. 1970. pp. 233-263.

²¹ On the basic similarities of the Western bureaucracies see Ernest Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660-1930*, New York 1945, p. 3, and Dwight Waldo, "Development in the West: The Administrative Framework", a Paper presented in the Seminar on "Development: The Western View", held at State University of New York, Albany, September 24- October 4, 1968, p. 33.

²² Here I am using these two concepts as used by Chester I. Barnard. See his *The Functions of the Executive*, Cambridge, Mass. 1966.

²³ Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America*, New York 1950, pp. 24-25.

performance.²⁴ To the extent that the bureaucracies could be urged to adopt the norms of the leading classes in the society²⁵, they were transformed from a "valued object" to an entity that could hardly be "distinguished from the 'back ground'".²⁶ As such, State bureaucracies increasingly adopted "a scientific technical expertise pertaining directly to administration conceived as a thing-in-itself".²⁷ This was the consequence of the fact that the predominant goals of any political system would condition the administrative processes and techniques.²⁸

In other words, the concept of efficiency as scientific-technical expertise pertaining to administration conceived as a thing-in-itself coincided in the West with the rise of the middle class and of the positive State. The Industrial Revolution compelled the State to assume new functions above and beyond the function of keeping law and order.²⁹ The related reorganization of the public services was effected by the "constructive destruction" of the earlier arrangements by capitalism which required consistency, objectivity, and trustworthiness on the part of the State bureaucracies.³⁰ In short, the business groups desired

²⁴ Earlier the Cameralists did not usually discuss the internal managerial problems and the decision-making process. See Hubert C. Johnson, "The Concept of Bureaucracy in Cameralism". *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 79 No. 3, 1964, pp. 378-379. On bureaucracy considered only as a repressive instrument toward the end of eighteenth century and the first part of nineteenth century, see Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, London 1970, Chap. 1.

²⁵ On the diffusion of middle class values to the bureaucratic sector in the West, see Joseph La Palombara, "Values and Ideologies in the Administrative Evolution of Western Constitutional Systems", in Braibanti (ed). *Political and Administrative Development*, pp. 166-219.

²⁶ Waldo, "Development in the West: The Administrative Framework", p. 5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31. The principle of rule of law as a Roman heritage was based on laws of commercial classes. See Peter H. Merkle, *Political Continuity and Change* New York 1967, p. 65.

²⁸ Karl Loewenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies, and Institutions: The Problem of Their Circulation". *Western Political Quarterly* December 1953, p. 697.

²⁹ Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* New York 1949, pp. 709-937, and Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* New York 1965, Chap. III.

³⁰ Joseph Schumpeter, *Kapitalismus, Socialismus and Demoktie* Bern, 1946 p. 137 cited in Nermin Abadan, *Bürokrasi* Ankara 1959, p. 47.

an efficient state that would facilitate and protect the development of commerce, and later, of industry.³¹

Thus, as the State initially helped business classes (mercantilist policies, etc.), then assumed the role of an arbitrator (rule of law, *laissez-faire*) and finally became a positive State,³² bureaucracy was transformed into an instrumental body with a technical expertise.

It was an evolution from substantive rationality as reflected in cameralism and in reason of state, toward formal rationality as reflected in narrow specialization in administrative techniques.³³ As such, the concept of efficiency went through a transformation. Earlier, the concept was more "political" than "administrative". Recently, it has begun to denote expertise for rational action where political ends are given.³⁴ The expertise in question was to be utilized in providing expert assistance to the political executive in the formulation of the

³¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Bureaucracy and Social Change", in Robert K. Merton et. al. (eds) *Reader in Bureaucracy* New York 1952, p. 222.

³² Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power", in *Ibid*, pp. 115-116. See also Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Bureaucracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* Boston 1966.

³³ For formal rationality as not being a token of power, thus giving the civil service an instrumental role, see Carl J. Friedrich. "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy", in Merton et. al. (ed.) *Reader in Bureaucracy*. pp. 30-31. For the distinctions between substantive and formal rationality in this context see Reinhard Bendix. *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* New York 1962, pp. 298.

³⁴ It is necessary to distinguish carefully between different conceptions of efficiency. The presumed basis of expertise by the mandarin administrators was chiefly the high culture of China—the humanist-literary-ethical culture of China. In the cameralist Prussian-Germany State, it was "law, economics, and state-craft". Efficiency for formal and routine functions was inadequate in a positive state. It took the rise of business classes and the assigning by them new functions to the civil bureaucracies for the concept of efficiency to denote "a scientific technical expertise pertaining directly to administration conceived as a thing-in-itself". See Waldo, "Development in the West: The Administrative Framework", p. 31; Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, p. 740; H. C. Creel, "The Beginning of Bureaucracy in China: The Origin of the Hsien," *Journal of Asian Studies* XXIII, No. 2, 1964, p. 56; Laurence J. R. Herson, "China's Imperial Bureaucracy: Its Direction and Control," *Public Administration Review* XVII, No. 1, 1957, p. 50; and Pauls Kim, "Dynamics of the Japanese Imperial Civil Service Under the Meiji Constitution, 1889-1945", *Public Personnel Review* XXVI, No. 2, 1965, p. 125.

basic policies and in intelligently and faithfully carrying them out once they are formulated.³⁵

The emergent administrative norm in the form of formal rationality supplied by the social system, i.e. here middle classes, and reinforced by the polity, i.e. "bourgeois politics", was preceded by certain general value transformations and accompanied by some structural and functional transformations both in society, and within the bureaucracy. The overall process of change in normative and socio-psychological orientations is sometimes referred to as "social mobilization". It is a "process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour". The process implies two distinct stages: uprooting or breaking away from old settings, habits and commitments, and the induction of the mobilized persons into some relatively stable new patterns of group membership, organization and commitment. These two subprocesses take place along with changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face associations, of institutions, roles, and ways of acting, of experiences and expectations and finally of personal memories, habits and needs, including the need for new pattern of group affiliation and new images of personal identity. These transformations are both a cause and consequence of "modernization," i.e. advanced, nontraditional practices in culture, technology and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale.³⁶

IV.

The relevance of these developments for the bureaucratic reform may be explained by the theory of structural constraints. "The essential point is that a commercial-industrial system imposes certain organizational and institutional requirements not only on the economy but also on many other aspects of society. That idea in turn rests on a

³⁵ For an analysis of what is expected from a bureaucracy in a democracy based on Western European ideals and concepts of government, see Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development", in La Palombara (ed.) *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, pp. 62-95.

³⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development" in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds) *Political Development and Social Change* New York 1968, pp. 205-207.

conception of close functional interdependence of the components of 'social systems.'"³⁷

The functional interdependence in the society necessitated in the West a structurally and functionally differentiated, bureaucracy reflecting societal orientations in its norms largely represented by the middle classes and accommodating and performing the functions assigned to it by its political masters :

The system of governmental organization is highly differentiated and functionally specific, and the allocation of political roles is by achievement rather than ascription, reflecting general characteristics of the society. Among other things this means a bureaucracy with a high degree of internal-specialization and with competence or merit as a standard for bureaucratic recruitment.... The public service of political system will be large scale, complex, and instrumental in the sense that its mission is understood to be that of carrying out the policies of the political decision makers. In other words, it will tend to have the attributes Weber specified for his "ideal-type" bureaucracy, including both the structural prerequisites and the behavioral tendencies mentioned by him.³⁸

Thus the bureaucratic model developed in the West which the developing countries have been aspiring to adopt, has developed as a response for a particular mode of social change—a change brought about by a middle-class which dominated polity and society. That the emergent model is far from a model of all purpose administration is well illustrated by the fact that the new demands arising in the Western societies and shifting values presently lead these societies toward a search for new formulations as to the nature of future bureaucracies.³⁹

³⁷ Wilbert E. Moore *The Impact of Industry* Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1965, pp. 11-12.

³⁸ Heady, *Public Administration A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 38-39.

³⁹ The proponents of the so called "The New Public Administration" in the U.S. argue that "the perpetuation of social injustice and... human misery makes many of the traditional concerns of public administration seem irrelevant". The argument is that the traditional concerns of public administration, efficiency, economy or simply good management seems to be less relevant than they were once thought to be. There

Besides I have so far emphasized the common characteristics in the Western bureaucratic development in order to indicate certain functional relationships that have affected the structure and orientations of the Western bureaucracies. As already noted, however, it should not be assumed that bureaucratic evolution was exactly the same in all Western countries. It is for this reason, in fact, that, as a first approximation, a distinction is made between the "Classic Administrative Systems" – France and Germany on the one hand and the "Administration in 'The Civic Culture'" – Great Britain and the United States. "Discontinuity in politics" in both Germany and France has led to the most notable characteristic of those continental European bureaucracies, namely that in these countries public officials, are considered as members of a corps or cadre representing and closely identified with the State. In contrast to Germany and France, the history of Great Britain and the United States is one of relative stability, and the civil service in the latter countries was markedly slow in becoming professionalized and in acquiring other important characteristics of Weberian-style bureaucracy.⁴⁰

At a lower level of generality, still basic differences may be noted within each pair. The British bureaucracy, for instance, seems to have a clear advantage over American in terms of prestige and status. This reflects general patterns of deference toward governmental and other form of authority in the society as well as more specific historical factors such as timing of conversion from a spoils to a merit service, the tradition in the United States of political party reliance on public service patronage, and the relative standing of governmental as against business careers.⁴¹ Furthermore, theoretical bases underlying the German and French bureaucracies were basically different. In Germany the transcendental view of the State was all pervasive. It justified

is a general agreement that there needs to be greater policy concern and concern with values in public administration. See H. George Frederickson and Frank Marini, "Is the 'Minnowbrook Perspective' Representative?" A Paper prepared for the Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Miami, May 19- 21, 1969

⁴⁰ Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 41-44. On the evolution of Continental European Bureaucracies toward a model approximating that of Weber's ideal-type, see Reinhard Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship* New York 1964, p. 109.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

concentration of power in the hands of the head of the state. It also justified the executive acting not in the interests of individual within the State, but in the interests of the State itself since the executive was conceived to be in a better position to determine what these were than any other organ of the State. French jurists reacted strongly against the German school of jurisprudence. They began from a fundamentally different premise: that the sovereign was the nation, not the State, and that the nation delegated its power to its representatives, the governors of the country. This gave the politicians a primacy over the public officials unlike the position in the German states.⁴²

V.

Recently it was argued that civilizations have flourished and maintained themselves only as they were able to effect a satisfactory balance between cultural achievement and the development of an organizational framework for society.⁴³ Without necessarily taking up the theme in such a broad perspective, one can still fruitfully investigate the familiar theme that administration is a cultural product⁴⁴ by comparing the patterns of bureaucratic evolution in Western and non-Western settings.

At a sufficiently high level of generality, one can safely argue that bureaucracies in the settings presently called developing countries have developed within frameworks of societal goals⁴⁵ and power configurations different from those of the West. Both in the historical bureaucratic empires and in the colonial settings, one could not witness an industrialization process led by the middle classes.

In the historical bureaucratic empires, the ruler and his entourage, a group world apart from the rest of population, usually overtaxed the

⁴² Brian Chapman, *The Profession of Government: The Public Service in Europe* (London, 1959), pp. 34-35.

⁴³ Gerald D. Nash, *Perspectives on Administration: The Vistas of History* Berkeley, California 1969, p. 4.

⁴⁴ "Administration is a cultural product, a social subsystem reflecting the values of the wider society". Gerald Caiden *Administrative Reform* Chicago, 1969, p. 11. See also Jose Velasa Abueva, "Administration, Culture and Behavior", in Edward W. Weidner, (ed), *Development Administration in Asia* Durham, N. C. 1970, pp. 132-186, particularly p. 136.

resources of the society for their noneconomic pursuits. In these states it was usual for the bureaucracies to be initially subjugated to the ruler, and thus develop a "service orientation". Gradually, however, the bureaucracies of the historical bureaucratic empires gained autonomy in the polity. As such, they either assumed a role of guardianship or developed orientations of self-aggrandizement, and they developed into stumbling blocks in countries on the road to political unification, continuous modernization and development.⁴⁶

In the formerly colonial areas, bureaucracies developed out of a tradition of service to the colonial governments. During the colonial stage, effective politics was carried at the metropolitan centers: the general characteristic of the "government" in the colonial areas was predominantly "administrative". As a consequence, after the advent of independence in these countries, a power vacuum has emerged, and was effectively filled by the bureaucracy.⁴⁷ Thus they too were involved in the political process. They became the effective executive or part of it, and set up policy objectives, involved in interest articulation often in their own right as a significant institutional pressure and interest group and acted as agents of political socialization vis-à-vis the rest of the society.⁴⁸

The extensive involvement of bureaucracies in the political process of the developing countries has been seen as the major stumbling block

⁴⁵ La Palombara refers to these as "crises" such as "geographic integration", "national identity", "legitimacy", "political participation", "distribution", "penetration", See Joseph La Palombara, "Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Nations", in Riggs (ed). *Frontiers of Development Administration*, p. 176.

⁴⁶ S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development", in La Palombara (ed.) *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, pp. 96-119, and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization: A Trend Report", *Current Sociology* VII, 1959. On historical empires see S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies* New York 1963.

⁴⁷ On the concept of power vacuums in this context, see Adolph A. Berle *Power* New York 1969, chap. 1. Although the indigenous bureaucrats were usually allowed to fill only lower posts in the colonial bureaucracy, nevertheless, they constituted the only political elite after independence. See Gabriel A. Almond and Jones S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* Princeton, N. J. 1960.

⁴⁸ Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development", p. 113.

in the transformation of these bureaucracies into a model approximating the Weberian characteristics. The uneven speed of change in the functional sectors of the transitional society, it is argued, has adversely effected the administrative performance.⁴⁹

In such a milieu, the Weberian bureaucratic model would greatly be distorted. The formal rationality would be replaced by substantive rationality. And if one remembers the pervasiveness of ideology in the developing countries⁵⁰ it would not be difficult to conclude that bureaucrats in the developing countries would largely be involved in grappling with the question of "what ought to be" rather than "what is" and "how."⁵¹

It should also be noted that when a social engineering is attempted in developing countries, despite the fact that goals underlying such attempts-usually nation-building and socio economic development-would not be very different from those that were pursued at one time or another in the West, their overlapping nature plus the urgency with which they are taken up lead to different bureaucratic patterns than that in the West. Thus it may turn out that the elites in the developing countries may opt for a polity where bureaucratic elites are on top and not on tap⁵², or to bring about some sort of a mobilization regime, and consequently at least in the short run, the effectiveness and loyalty rather than efficiency of bureaucracies become significant.⁵³ In such cases, of course, the bureaucratic reform patterns, if ever consciously considered, become subordinate to some higher political values⁵⁴.

⁴⁹ Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View", in Palombara (ed.) *Bureaucratic and Political Development*, pp. 120-167.

⁵⁰ David Apter (ed.) *Ideology and Discontent*, Glencoe, III. 1964.

⁵¹ Martin Landau, "Decision Theory and Comparative Public Administration", *Comparative Political Studies* July 1968, pp. 175-196.

⁵² Esman, "Politics of Development Administration", passim.

⁵³ For various regime types and the corresponding bureaucratic patterns, see Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, pp. 73-97; and Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case", pp. 233-239.

⁵⁴ Joseph La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries, and Dilemmas", in La Palombara (ed.) *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, p. 50.

VI.

The preceding analysis indicates that administrative reform is closely intertwined with some normative considerations. It is intimately related to social change and system relationships in a polity. Social change is sometimes conceived as necessitating an overhaul in the bureaucratic sector in order to bring it in line with the other sectors, and make it subservient to the needs and demands arising from other systems.⁵⁵ At the same time, the administrative system acts as a catalyst in furthering or hampering social change. In other words, social change brings along with it new needs and goals which in turn sometimes render a bureaucratic transformation imperative; the existing bureaucratic institution, however, contributes to the particular configuration in which social change and needs and goals derivative from it present themselves.

When administrative reform is conceived in this framework of large scale engineering, it becomes apparent that, on the one hand, transfer of formal organizational blueprints from different societies should not be attempted before a thorough investigation of the relevant characteristics in the two settings, and, on the other hand, any administrative reform has political implications. Depending upon one's perspective, "strengthening" of the bureaucracy may be conceived functional or dysfunctional vis-à-vis political and/or economic development.⁵⁶

It follows that, one can safely lay down very few guidelines as universal prerequisites that every administrative social engineering may aspire to. Various paths to development may be chosen, and each path is necessarily a compromise between various subgoals.

One might argue, however, that in terms of the contemporary developing countries, nation-building and socio-economic development are the basic goals, and that, under the circumstances, at least in the initial phases of development, the State and its bureaucracy has to play a significant role. If political development is deemed as a significant goal, then one might have second thoughts on the desirability of ad-

⁵⁵ Braibanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth".

⁵⁶ Fred W. Riggs. "The Dialectics of Developmental Conflict". *Comparative Political Studies* July 1968, pp. 197-226.

ministrative reform that make bureaucracy more "modern" and thus more influential.

To the extent that the goals of nation building and/or socio-economic development are given emphases, the State and its bureaucracy has to expand its activities;⁵⁷ in the case of nation-building, or in the post-industrial stage, there seems to be a greater need for bureaucratic expansion and for the proliferation of state activities as compared to later phases of industrialization process.

It seems also that the expansion of bureaucratic activities needs to be coupled by structural and functional differentiation and a certain amount of coordination. And differentiation and coordination (or "integration") need to be accompanied by a secularization process so as to optimize performance.

Differentiation process in a society starts when political and administrative functions become separated from economic, religious and other functions, and one social role or organization differentiates into two or more roles or organizations which function more effectively in the new circumstances.⁵⁸ Such differentiation, however, presupposes resources freed from traditional units or what Eisenstadt calls "free floating resources."⁵⁹ The last concept refers to normative orientations stripped of any traditionalistic-dogmatic characteristics. In other words, in order that appropriate criteria of action be developed for each sphere of activity, inflexible criteria of action has to be eliminated.

It is for this reason that a general secularization process⁶⁰ has to precede or at least accompany the bureaucratic institutionalization pattern. If the bureaucracy has to be an efficient tool to implement the policies handed down by the political elite, it must be ready to assume orientations appropriate for the job at hand.

"It would seem that only the presence of a high degree of secularization could ensure an intelligent application of the concept of differentiation so as to ensure greater performance.

⁵⁷ See Holt and Turner, *The Political Basic of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis*, Princeton, New Jersey 1966.

⁵⁸ R. S. Milne "Differentiation and Administrative Development", *Journal of Comparative Administration* August 1966, pp. 213-234.

⁵⁹ Eisenstadt, "Institutionalization and Change", *American Sociological Review* April 1964, p. 237.

This, however, would point to secularization as a key variable and diminish the importance of differentiation."⁶¹

Once a certain degree of cultural secularization is accomplished, then it becomes meaningful and necessary to have structural and functional differentiation, for it has been persuasively argued that greater the functional differentiation in a social system, the greater the opportunity for variation and innovation.⁶² The greater opportunity for innovation and variation is required to absorb and accommodate the new functions emerging from the proliferation of the demands as a society modernizes:

"Within the political sphere, the equivalent of such [the economist's] self sustained growth is the ability to absorb varieties and changing types of political demands and organization. It also includes the skill to deal with new and changing type of problems which the system produces or which it must absorb from outside resources."⁶³

The differentiation process thus required for self-sustained growth is concisely and carefully delineated by Landau :

"As a system develops, not only does it increase in size, but its parts assumed definite structures and functions. The *differentiated structures and specialized functions* further become subject to a central control, The system, thus exhibits the property of *centralization*. The concept of development refers to this process of differentiation, and the more developed the system, the greater the degree of specialization, With increased specialization, certain structures take control over others and operate to integrate the various behaviors within the system."⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Here secularization is defined as the process whereby man becomes increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in his political and administrative behavior. As such, it is "cultural secularization." See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* Boston, 1966, pp. 21-25.

⁶¹ Milne, "Differentiation and Administrative Development", p. 229.

⁶² G. H. Zollschan and W. Hirsch, *Explorations in Social Change* Boston 1964, p. 226.

⁶³ Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development", p. 96.

⁶⁴ Martin Landau, "On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political Science", *Social Research* January 1968, p. 57. The emphases are Landau's.

VIII.

There is a close relation between the differentiation pattern and the functions to be performed. The nation-building activities would necessitate closer centralization or integration, whereas activities related to socio-economic development would usually necessitate a looser organizational pattern, particularly after the take-off period.⁶⁵

Apart from the type of functions and the stages of development at which they will be performed, the particular regime types, within which a bureaucracy will operate is also significant. For example, depending upon whether the bureaucracy has to operate in a mobilizational as against a conciliatory regime type, the extensiveness of bureaucratic activities, the qualifications of the bureaucrats themselves, in particular their loyalties and professional orientations would, or rather should, display significant differences. For instance, to the extent that a political regime type is closer to a mobilizational system in preindustrial or early industrializing stage, bureaucratic activities increase, the loyalty and effectiveness rather than efficiency of the bureaucrats become functional, and less responsiveness, on the part of the bureaucrat may suffice or be justified.⁶⁶

While it may be necessary for the bureaucracy to adopt a participation-oriented role and to a certain extent be subservient to the political elite so that it would specialize in properly administrative functions, the last requirement would also involve a certain degree of autonomy on the part of bureaucracy. Within the framework of politically determined goals and policies, bureaucracy should have a leeway to develop into a professional body. As such it may develop certain standards and criteria of performance, and becomes a competent corps ready to implement a fairly variegated set of policies.

⁶⁵ Liberman reforms in U. S. S. R. are accompanied by efforts to decentralize the system. See Frederick Barghoorn *Politics in USSR*, Boston 1966, Chap. VIII. For a study of decentralization from the present perspective see also Herbert H. Werlin, "Elasticity of Control: An Analysis of Decentralization," *Journal of Comparative Administration* August 1970, pp. 185-210.

⁶⁶ Ashford, "Bureaucrats and Citizens," *The Annals* March 1965, pp. 89-100.

IX.

Now a synopsis of the present argument followed by an analysis of the situation in Turkey : Administrative systems approach to bureaucratic reform is unsatisfactory. Even in the West, "ideal types" even when they were originally conceived were not *ideal*: for settings of different parameters, they become wholly inappropriate. This becomes particularly apparent when one studies the different patterns of developmental change both in the West and in the developing countries. Varying social, and political configurations from which two sets of countries set off in their developmental change and the different sequence of goals pursued lead to different bureaucratic patterns.

In the long run, any successful social engineering vis-a-vis the bureaucracy has to start from the basic assumption of the theory of social constraints, or the systematic and functional relationships in a society. One also has to keep in mind that it is necessary to view such relationships within a framework of moving rather than static equilibrium. Within such a framework, bureaucracy is both an independent and a dependent variable. Nonbureaucratic system both influence bureaucratic development and set a limit to variations that the bureaucratic system may assume. At the same time, bureaucracy would influence developments in the nonbureaucratic system, all the more so in some stages of societal evolution.

The social engineering related to bureaucracy thus involves normative implications. Any manipulation on bureaucracy turns out to be functional or dysfunctional as related to economic and/or political development, depending, of course, on how you define these two concepts.

Within this milieu of relativity, there still seems to remain some guide posts to go by, providing, of course, that one makes certain assumptions: To the extent that one can assume that nation-building and socio-economic development are the twin goals pursued by the contemporary developing societies, there will have to be quantitative increase in bureaucratic activities accompanied by qualitative changes in bureaucratic structure and orientations—structural functional differentiation and cultural secularization. Cultural secularization will involve a participatory-orientation and formal rationality, particularly past the take-off stage. The particular patterns within which structural

functional differentiation and cultural secularization will evolve will be determined by nonbureaucratic as well as bureaucratic system characteristics.

Thus the definite scope and extent of bureaucratic reform depends on how many system characteristics you assume, or have to assume constant. To the extent that one limits social engineering to limited systems, one inevitably constraints what can be done in the way of "improving" performance in the bureaucratic sector.

As already noted, the substitution of ecological approach which is multidirectional and interdependent in place of an environmental approach which is unidirectional and deterministic⁶⁷, is a more realistic approach but at the same a difficult approach to utilize, simply because, first, it is difficult to decide as to where to start, and second, any social engineering has limited capabilities. Below an *initial* attempt will be made to utilize the ecological perspective with respect to the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy.

Here it is assumed that certain systemic and/or socio-psychological variables may be determined as being more significant than others when one makes certain assumptions about the predominant societal goal, the regime type within which attempts are made to accomplish that goal, and the impact of socio-economic spheres on bureaucratic sectors.

X.

In the Ottoman-Turkish State the predominant societal goals since the early eighteenth century have been "state-saving", and then nation-building. Only during the last half century or so, conscious and systemic efforts have been made at socio-economic development. In the pursuance of these goals, the bureaucracy has played a significant role. In the absence of strong and imposing middle classes, the bureaucracy was impressed by models of modernization from outside rather than from within. It followed that certain selective institutions of the Western societies were borrowed with little or no regard to the socio-economic base. Thus, bureaucratic activities multiplied, accom-

⁶⁷ For this distinction see Fred W. Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration".

panied by structural and functional differentiation. But an appropriate "cultural secularization" process was difficult to come by. Although the hampering impact of the traditional society was largely alleviated by education, in the absence of middle classes as developed in the West, and as a reaction to the essentially Islamic basis of the State, that education led to a quasi-ideological conception of modernity.⁶⁸ Such orientations on the part of the bureaucracy was facilitated by the predominance of state-saving and nation-building over socio-economic goals. Consequently substantive rationality on the part of the bureaucracy predominated over and above the formal rationality. It seems, therefore, that the predominant issue in the reform efforts of Turkish bureaucracy was and is that of cultural secularization. Certain assumptions underlie the present propositions. Now let me elaborate on the above sweeping arguments.⁶⁹

In the early Ottoman state, a merger between the "ghazi" traditions and Islam led to a relatively static conception of the functions of the state based upon traditional formulae. The later increases in Islamic influences only reinforced such tendencies.⁷⁰ The *civil* bureaucracy during this period of quasi-medieval order was a relatively insignificant component of the polity. The recruitment and educational structures plus the domination by strong and energetic Sultans largely determined the political orientations of the bureaucracy.⁷¹ The early system of extracting surplus economic resources by means of a timariot system ruled out

⁶⁸ It should here be reiterated that the present study purports to account for the nature of the bureaucratic behavior in the Ottoman-Turkish state essentially in terms of systematic-education, nature of middle classes, etc. – rather than socio-psychological variables. For an excellent study of the impact of religion on behavior in the Ottoman-Turkish State see Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji* Ankara 1969.

⁶⁹ The following elaboration on the above argument is largely a resumé from the author's "Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition," Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, New York, U. S. A., September 1970.

⁷⁰ Claude Cahen *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, London 1968, pp. 184, 234-46, 329; H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol I, Part I, London 1950, pp. 26-27; Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London 1965, pp. 13-14, and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal 1964, p. 11.

⁷¹ Halil İnalcık "[Turkey:] The Nature of Traditional Society" in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton, N.J. 1964, p. 42.

the flourishing of autonomous local aristocracies.⁷² In the following centuries, however, largely due to military reverses, a stage of disintegration of the early quasi-medieval order set in.⁷³ After a relatively brief attempt to preserve the initial pattern,⁷⁴ the superiority of the West was admitted and the traditional Islamic concept of "justice" (*adalet*) was reinterpreted. It no longer meant securing to each category of the ruled no less and no more than it deserved according to its function or state. It now meant, rather, promulgation of secular legislation outside the jurisdiction of the Islamic traditions.⁷⁵ To a certain extent freed from imposing shackles of Islamic traditions, the Ottoman modernizers, in order to reinvigorate the Empire, sought new formulae from the West. Thus they were able to borrow first military and later administrative and political institutions from the contemporary Western countries. In the administrative sphere, new secular schools and departments (agencies) were established.⁷⁶ The impact of these schools on the students from a traditional society was impressive. It was now education that set the members of the higher echelons of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy as a group apart from other social groups in the society.⁷⁷ And while they were gaining prominence in the polity, no extensive and influential middle class similar in composition to those of the contemporary West was in sight. Unguarded against the In-

⁷² Kemal Karpat "The Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire", in Polk and Chambers (eds.) *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, p. 74; and Muzaffer Sencer *Osmanlı Toplum Yapısı*, İstanbul 1969, pp. 232-33, 243-44.

⁷³ Frank Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, London 1942, pp. 77-79.

⁷⁴ Roderic H. Davison *Turkey: The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1968, p. 32.

⁷⁵ "Mahmud brought the concept of *adalet* (justice) to the field of legal enactments where it meant the promulgation and judicial execution of rules outside (and later superseding) the "will" of the Sultan, as ruler and as caliph, and outside the Seriat. He used the word *adl* in a number of institutions he created". Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* pp. 94-95.

⁷⁶ Richard L. Chamber "[Turkey] The Civil Bureaucracy", in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, p. 306.

⁷⁷ Roderic H. Davison *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* Princeton, N. J. 1963, p. 32, and Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* December 1968, p. 455.

dustrial Revolution in Europe, the artisan guilds (Hirfet Erbabı) were feebler in the nineteenth century than before.⁷⁸

These developments led to an extensive structural functional differentiation not accompanied by a cultural secularization toward formal rationality and efficiency. On the one hand, the civil bureaucracy had become a prominent member of the polity, and, on the other, the non Islamic formulae had remained in a precarious position and a constant fight had to be given to keep that area free from new attacks. The preoccupation was with making the new secularly based institutions firmly established; otherwise there would have been no administrative institutions to be efficient for. Urquhart vividly developed this argument:

A man who would be considered in Europe perfectly ignorant, may be, in Turkey if he is only honest, an able and excellent administrator... therefore it is that Europeans form a false estimate, by an erroneous standard, of the administrative capacity of the Turks.⁷⁹

Thus the uneven bureaucratic development: the structural and functional differentiation was not accompanied by a flexible (or principal) value system⁸⁰; the "phenomenon of modernization as cultural diffusion process" lagged behind the "development as a pattern of structural and functional differentiation."⁸¹

With the transition to the Republican period, bureaucracy in general and the civil bureaucracy in particular acquired primarily a secular-prescriptive political value system expressed in principles such as nationalism, populism, and étatisme. The prevailing norm of the civil bureaucracy was an adamant insistence to contribute to public policy in accordance with a few "revolutionary" and political princip-

⁷⁸ Sencer, *Osmanlı Toplum Yapısı* pp. 318 ff.

⁷⁹ David Urquhart, *Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization, Prospects of English Commerce in the East, etc.*, London 1833, pp. 121-122.

⁸⁰ Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan", in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds), *Political Development and Social Change*, New York 1968.

⁸¹ For these two aspects of modernization, or development, see Fred W. Riggs "Political Aspects of Developmental Change", in Art Gallaher, Jr. *Perspectives in Developmental Change*, Lexington, Ky. 1968, pp. 145-146.

les now rendered relatively static.⁸² This was only to be expected in an intellectual environment where the dominant tradition for centuries past was unquestioned belief in a few theological norms.⁸³

That empirical and creative studies have not in general been found in Turkish Universities⁸⁴ seems to be a consequence of the earlier intellectual tradition but also of the requirements of the new political goals. Due to the specific pattern of modernization-Westernization with an emphasis only on some selective institutions-reformism soon acquired a relatively static meaning. It came to mean preserving and safeguarding whatever institutional transformations were effected in the fabric of the Turkish social and political structure.⁸⁵ These institutional transformations have become ends when they should have been only means.⁸⁶

Thus the early decades of the first Turkish Republic witnessed an attempt to create a "bureaucratic middle class" who would be instrumental in creating and *preserving* intact the "modern" institutions of the Republican Turkey.⁸⁷ The new state was going to be a "bureaucratic state".⁸⁸ A long range program of creating a new generation of civil servants loyal to the original Republican ethics was adopted.⁸⁹

These sets of ethics did not admit the possibility of the growth of new groups in the society which would attempt to impose their own

⁸² Editorial, "Dertlerimizizin Asıl Kaynağı", *Forum* July 1965, pp. 1-2. Formal education in Turkey aimed to create graduates intellectually superior and well versed in normative-theoretical formulations with special emphasis on "national consciousness, ideologies, values, and behaviors different from those that existed before". Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* Chicago 1966, p. 209.

⁸³ Osman Okyar, "Universities in Turkey", *Minerva* Winter 1968, pp. 223-224.

⁸⁴ Aydın Yalçın, "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar", *Forum* August 1955, p. 19.

⁸⁵ Sabahattin Selek, *Anadolu İhtilâli*, İstanbul 1968, p. 713.

⁸⁶ Mümtaz Turhan *Garplılaşmanın Neresindeyiz?* İstanbul 1967, pp. 15, 71-72. It should be noted, however, that recently reformism of 1920s and 1930s was interpreted to also mean "continuous reforms on the face of changing conditions". See Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*, Ankara n.d., pp. 17 ff.

⁸⁷ Şerif Mardin, "Türkiyede Orta Sınıfların Üç Devri", *Forum* February 1, 1957, p. 11.

⁸⁸ Selek, *Anadolu İhtilâli*, p. 491.

⁸⁹ Falih Rifki Atay, *Çankaya*, İstanbul 1969, p. 448 and H. E. Wortham *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey* Boston 1931, p. 207.

bureaucratic ruling tradition. The fabric of society as inherited from the Ottoman Empire, however, was not a classless and homogeneous one.⁹⁰ It was true that initially there were no middle classes capable of inducing an "organic growth", so the State had to take the initiative in one way or another. And it did so. The ruling political-bureaucratic elite supported economically those groups with which they cooperated during the War of Independence, and those now depended upon for certain State functions. These groups initially tolerated the version of modernization efforts attempted, because these reforms did not affect unfavorably their economic interests. But once these groups grew in economic strength and the étatist policies interfered with their economic interest, their relations with the state were strained.⁹¹ The newly emerging economic groups thus aspired for political office, and with the aid of a group of liberal intelligentsia, did capture political office in 1950.

It is significant, however, that although new social groups have had emerged and taken their places in the polity, they were not bringing with them new norms and new values. The political bureaucratic elite of the earlier era, largely building on the intellectual heritage of the preceding period, had introduced to Turkish political thinking a systematic body of principles. The elite aspiring to political office had to come up with an equally persuasive ideology if they were going to base on sound intellectual grounds their twin goals of opening up both economic and political life.⁹²

The adamant insistence on earlier Republican ethics on the part of the bureaucracy was facilitated and reinforced by the nature of the emerging middle classes—an "underdeveloped bourgeoisie",⁹³ and reaction of the traditional "intellectual-bureaucratic elite."⁹⁴ No middle class economically autonomous from the state have emer-

⁹⁰ İsmail Cem, *Türkiyede Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi* İstanbul 1970, passim.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 223-39, and Robert Devereux, "Turkish Economic Doctrine, Old and New", *Social Science* April 1962.

⁹² Editorial, "Meselelerimiz ve Mânevi Hazırlık Zarureti", *Forum* December 15, 1955, p. 1.

⁹³ Cem, *Türkiyede Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi*, p. 296.

⁹⁴ Metin And, "Türkiyede Aydınlar", *Forum* January 1, 1956, p. 25, and Niyazi Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusculuk ve Toplumsal Devrimler* İstanbul 1965, p. 138.

ged,⁹⁵ and under the shield of autonomy granted to them in 1946, certain university professors assumed the role of earlier Republican political elites in inculcating in bureaucratic elite a conception of politics based on "reason."⁹⁶

It followed that the civil bureaucratic elite remained essentially intact despite the emergence of a new and largely hostile political elite. This bureaucratic elite assumed "negative politics" toward the new political elite and even asserted its right to rule. Karpaz wrote in 1959:

"The present day bureaucracy in Turkey has changed considerably in the light of political developments in the country, but it still possesses the power, owing to its long entrenched habits and still to mold the policy of any government to accord with its own mentality and views."⁹⁷

The 1960 upheaval in Turkey essentially reinforced the role of bureaucracy in the polity. A vivid example of this trend is the 1961 Constitution which bolstered the position of what is called "autonomous institutions" like universities and Turkish Radio and Television Agency at the expense of the Executive.⁹⁸

XI.

The above brief analysis, points to the uneven development between structural-functional differentiation and cultural secularization

⁹⁵ On this concept, see Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*, passim.

⁹⁶ See for instance, Bahri Savcı, "İktidar Savaşı Yapmadan Siyaset", *Forum* July 1955, and Mümtaz Soysal, "Yanlış Reçete", *Yön* February 28, 1962.

⁹⁷ Kemal H. Karpaz, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi Party System*, Princeton, N. J. 1954, p. 150.

⁹⁸ See Turkish 1961 Constitution, articles 120-122; Mümtaz Soysal, *Anayasaya Giriş*, Ankara, 1969, p. 144; and Selçuk Yalçındağ, "Kamu Yönetim Sistemimizin Tarihsel Evrimi Üzerine Notlar". *Amme İdaresi Dergisi* June, 1970, p. 57. It should be kept in mind that the Executive in Turkey usually constitutes the apex of the political elite. See Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Chap. 10. For the ongoing political significance of bureaucracy in Turkey of late 1960s, see Görüşler-Yorumlar, "Türk İdaresinde Politik Nitelikte Yüksek Kademe Yöneticilik Mevkileri İhdas Edilmeli midir?" *Amme İdaresi Dergisi* June, September, 1968, pp. 72-83, 112-118 respectively.

in the Ottoman-Turkish State. While new agencies were constantly created and "modern" procedures were adopted with an increasing tempo since Mahmud II., the administrative norms remained predominantly political. Administrative rationality has been a substantive rather than a formal rationality.

In terms of the new bureaucratic model, delineated above for developing countries on the way to development— where new groups arise in society and lead developmental efforts— Turkish bureaucracy with a predominantly political orientation may be considered dysfunctional. Here it is assumed, of course, that the new groups will represent progressive forces in the society, however, you define "social good."⁹⁹ In any case, the First and Second Five Year Plans in this country assigns to the bureaucracy an instrumental rather than a substantive role in the developmental efforts.¹⁰⁰ Besides, there are some indications that soon the "underdeveloped bourgeoisie" of 1950s may be gradually replaced by a "nationalistic" and "industrializing" bourgeoisie which would require consistent, stable, and rational service from the bureaucracy.¹⁰¹

Viewed from this perspective, the efforts to reorganize the Turkish administrative system should emphasize cultural secularization as well as structural functional differentiation and reorganization. So far emphasis has been on structural and functional reorganization¹⁰² with relatively little emphasis on need for change in administrative norms

⁹⁹ Braibanti notes that in developing countries "quantitative increase in participation makes it necessary that the administrative apparatus should assume a greater burden of leadership and responsibility than would be the case in an advanced system". See his "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth", p. 241.

¹⁰⁰ Devlet Plânlama Teşkilâtı, *Kalkınma Plânı, Birinci Yıl Plân Hedefleri ve Stratejisi* Ankara, 1963, p. 528, and *Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, İkinci Beş Yıl* Ankara, 1967, p. 623.

¹⁰¹ Ali Gevgilili, "Türkiyede Ekonomik ve Politik Yapı", *Mimarlık* (February 71), p. 36-40; Yalçın Küçük, "Aydınlar ve Reformlar", *Milliyet* (April 10, 71) p.; and Düşünenlerin Forumu, "Türkiyenin Gerçekleri ve Reformlar", *Milliyet* (December 12, 1971), pp. 2,7.

¹⁰² See Kenan Sürgit, "Türkiyede İdareyi Yeniden Düzenleme ve Geliştirme Çabaları", pp. 3-17.

from predominantly substantive-prescriptive toward predominantly instrumental and principal orientation.¹⁰³

Recent developments in the Turkish polity toward a stronger and "Kemalistic" Executive may in fact facilitate the "desired" transformation in the Turkish bureaucracy. The bureaucratic background of the new political elite may prevent the development of negative politics on the part of bureaucratic elite toward the political elite. At the same time a happy medium may be struck between the abstract rationalism of Kemalism and potential pragmatic rationalism of the new emerging bourgeoisie.

These propositions would remain meaningful of course, to the extent the bulk of the socio-economic programs will no longer have to be undertaken by the State and that no new major measures will be needed at nation-building, i.e Eastern question in Turkey will not develop into a serious problem.

It is also necessary that no hard line ideological rift should dominate the Turkish political life, and replace or rather take its place along the Islamic-Modernistic controversy which in fact led to the uneven Turkish bureaucratic development. Otherwise, replacement of prescriptive by principal orientations would be difficult to come by.

Admittedly, or rather inevitably, the present analysis is partial, and carried out only in terms of a few systemic variables. It is the argument here, however, that in terms of the particular historical evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish state, the variables we have utilized here seem to be the most relevant for a meaningful analysis of administrative reform in this country. We certainly feel that there is an urgent need to develop a new paradigm of a theory of administrative reform in Turkey. Perhaps this is the gist of the present argument.

¹⁰³ For an indirect reference to this problem, see, inter alia, Mümtaz Soysal, *Dinamik Anayasa Anlayışı: Anayasa Diyalektiği Üzerine Bir Deneme*, Ankara 1969, p. 8; and Selçuk Yalçındağ, "Değişen Koşullar ve Mahalli İdarelerimiz", *Amme İdaresi Dergisi* June 1968, pp. 18-31. These references are indirect in the sense that no effort is made to link political role of bureaucracy to its everyday efficiency.

ÖZET

OSMANLI-TÜRK DEVLETİNDE İDARİ REFORM TEORİSİNİN VARSAYIMLARI ÜZERİNE DÜŞÜNCELER

Osmanlı-Türk Devletinde idari reform anlayışının arkasında, idarî sistem perspektifi yolu ile reform varsayımı yatmaktadır. Bu varsayıma göre idarî sistem görelî olarak otonom kabul edilmektedir. Ve bu otonom idari sistemin, gelişmiş Batılı endüstriyel ülkelerde geliştirilmiş ideal idare yahut “bürokrasi” modellerinden yararlanılarak geliştirileceği düşünülmektedir. Sözü edilen bu modellerin, her zaman ve yer için en verimli idari faaliyeti olanaklı kılacağı kabul edilmektedir.

Ne varki Batıda geliştirilen ideal bürokrasi modelleri bir kere Batıda ağır eleştirilere uğramıştır. Daha da önemlisi bütünüyle değişik bir çevrenin ürünü olan Batı bürokrasi modellerini değişik ekolojilere sahip az gelişmiş ülkelerde uygulama çabaları, elde edilmek istenen sonuca göre daima başarısızlıkla neticelenmiştir.

Bir taraftan az gelişmiş ülkeler benzer yapılara sahip değildirlir. Eskiden sömürge olan ve olmayan az gelişmiş ülkeler değişik bürokratik tecrübelerle sahip oldukları gibi her iki kategori içindeki ülkeler de homojen bir görünüm vermekten uzaktırlar. Öte yandan gelişmiş ülkelerle az gelişmiş ülkelerin yapıları arasında temel farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Devletten tam otonom duruma gelen orta sınıfların güçlenmesi sonucu bürokrasi Batıda genellikle siyasal, gücün kontrolü altına girmiş ve salt idari, örneğin verim, konuları öncelik kazanmıştır. Az gelişmiş ülkelerde ise Devlet daha doğrusu bürokrasi toplumu kontrolü altında tutmuş, bürokrasi yüzünden idari olmaktan çok siyasal konular öncelik kazanmıştır.

Bu temel çelişki açısından bakılınca az gelişmiş ülkelerde idareyi geliştirme çabalarında geleneksel reform modellerinin yetersizliği hemen görülmektedir. Giderek modernleşme sürecinin analitik çözümlenmesi zorunluluğu ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Modernleşme sürecinin uluslaşma ve sosyo-ekonomik kalkınma süreçlerine indirgenmesi olanaklıdır. Bu anlamda kültürel sekularizasyon ve yapısal-işlevsel farklılaşma modernleşme sürecinin temel öğeleri olarak düşünülebilir.

Osmanlı-Türk devletinde bürokrasi II. Mahmud devrinden başlayarak yapısal-işlevsel farklılaşma sürecine girmiş ise de normatif-siyasal bir yaklaşımdan arınma anlamında kültürel sekularizasyon sürecinde geride kalmıştır. Osmanlı-Türk bürokrasisinde egemen olmuş normatif-siyasal yaklaşım, bir taraftan Batıdaki anlamda orta sınıfların gelişmemesinin, öte yandan da Osmanlı-Türk modernleşme sürecinin temel çelişkisinin dinsel-seküler diyalogu olmasının bir sonucudur. Bu diyalogda önemli bir taraf olan bürokrasinin sözünü ettiğimiz normatif-siyasal yaklaşımı benimsemesi kaçınılmaz olmuştur.

Eğer Batıdakilere bir bakıma benzer verimli bir bürokrasi kurulmak isteniyorsa ilkönce bürokrasinin normatif-siyasal yaklaşımının değiştirilmesi gerekli görünmektedir. Bu, kabul edilmek gerekir ki, salt idari değil ve fakat aynı zamanda siyasal sonuçları da önemli olacak ve düşünülmesi gerekecek bir çözümlerdir.